FROM THE DIRECTOR’S DESK: CIRCLE IS MOVING TO TUFTS UNIVERSITY

CIRCLE is moving to Tufts! During the summer of 2008, CIRCLE will become part of the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts University. An ideal home for our organization, Tisch College is committed to active citizenship at Tufts, in the surrounding communities, and in the nation and the world. Working with colleagues at Tufts and partners at other institutions, we will help to build an innovative, ambitious, and rigorous research program that will influence scholarship and practice and thereby help to renew democracy.

We are deeply grateful to the University of Maryland, which has been our home since we were founded in 2001. A great land-grant state university, Maryland recognizes its civic mission and has built important programs and initiatives to educate its own students in active citizenship, to engage with its surrounding communities, and to study and support civic engagement. In fact, CIRCLE is the lineal descendant of the National Commission on Civic Renewal, housed at the University of Maryland in the late 1990s. CIRCLE’s other closest associations have been with Maryland School of Public Policy and the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy, highly...

“MILLENNIALS TALK POLITICS: A STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENT POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT”

College students in the United States are hungry for political conversation that is authentic, involves diverse views and is free of manipulation and “spin,” according to a report released in November by CIRCLE and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. The report follows up on a 1993 study conducted by the Harwood Group for the Kettering Foundation that found students considered politics “irrelevant” to their lives and they saw little purpose in actively participating in politics. Current students do not share those views—they are eager to go into their communities and put their education to work. The report reveals major changes in today’s college students’ behaviors and attitudes as compared to Generation X. Millennial college students are more engaged in their communities and think the political system could be a vehicle for change, but they are turned off by intensely combative political debate and “spin.”

“Millennials Talk Politics” was released on November 7th at The University of California’s Washington Center in Washington, DC. The event included a series of panel discussions with top political, academic, and civic engagement experts and students.

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supportive homes for our work. The University has offered generous financial assistance.

We have therefore wrestled with a choice between two attractive options for our future. We are confident that by moving to Tufts we will join and strengthen an excellent intellectual community concerned with active citizenship.

We have begun to develop a long-term research agenda to guide our work over years to come. We welcome comments on this agenda, which is not yet finalized. The main components would include:

1. **SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF RESEARCH FROM PROGRAMS TO THE BROADER CONTEXT OF EDUCATION**

CIRCLE’s most successful publication has been the *Civic Mission of Schools* (2003), which used evaluations of specific civic education programs and statistical evidence about the impact of social studies classes and service-learning courses to argue for reforms in education policy.

We continue to believe that courses and programs matter, and there is still much to be learned from evaluations and formal and informal experiments. However, the effects of civics courses and other educational modules—while statistically significant—are rarely very large. For example, studying social studies in high school seems to increase scores on tests of political knowledge by a few percentage points. Some scholars conclude that schools aren’t especially important to civic development.

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2. RECONSIDERING THE “FORMATIVE YEARS”

Already in the 1920s, Karl Mannheim argued that adolescence was the period in which we develop lifelong attitudes and habits relevant to politics and civil society. He wrote, “even if the rest of one’s life consisted in one long process of negation and destruction of the natural world view acquired in youth, the determining influence of these early impressions would still be predominant.” Mannheim even identified a particular age, 17, as the apogee of the developmental years. In the same period, John Dewey emphasized that adolescents had “malleable” civic values, in contrast to the fixed values of adults. And Erik Erikson saw the development of identities (including civic identities) as a task of adolescence.

For the approximately one third of all American youth who drop out of high school, the transition to adulthood may be over when they are 15. Meanwhile, for middle-class people, the transition may still be incomplete at age 30.

However, the age at which most people settle on civic identities probably varies, depending on social context. In a literature review of political socialization published in 2003, Sears and Levy defined “the impressionable years” as the “period up to one’s late twenties, roughly.” There are reasons to think that the formative period may have changed over the decades and may be different for Americans of different classes.

Traditionally, we think that individuals have completed the transition to adulthood when they have finished their last year of school, started their own family, and obtained a job. For evidence that the transition now takes longer (on average) consider that the sheer number of Americans over the age 25 who are enrolled in some kind of school has increased almost sevenfold since 1970; the proportion of people between the ages of 18 and 25 who are married has dropped by two-thirds in that period; and the proportion of firstborns whose mothers are over the age of thirty has risen by at least ninefold. Today, according to Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., Ruben G. Rumbaut, and Richard A. Settersten Jr. (2005), American parents spend an average of $38,000 per child while their children are between the ages of 18 and 34—a huge downward flow of cash to post-adolescents that must be unprecedented.

Despite these aggregate statistics, there are many working-class youth who are out of school by age 17, receive no financial support from the older generation, and have their own children while still teenagers. For the approximately one third of all American youth who drop out of high school, the transition to adulthood may be over when they are 15. Meanwhile, for middle-class people, the transition may still be incomplete at age 30.

The year 1970 is a controversial baseline. Nevertheless, it appears that the transition to adulthood has changed dramatically for wealthier Americans since then, while remaining much more static for the working-class. These patterns invite us to ask:

(1) Has the formative period of political socialization expanded to encompass the third decade of life?

(2) Are the declines that we see in indicators like voter turnout really declines, or are middle-class young people simply delaying citizenship, much as they are have delayed starting their families and careers?

(3) What institutional supports and policies are appropriate for young people between the ages of 18 and 30 who are not enrolled in schools or colleges? Examples might include voluntary national service programs. (Note that today the government basically ceases to provide opportunities for education and development at age 18, except for those who attend college or enlist in the military.)

3. FOCUSING SPECIAL ATTENTION ON THE WORKING CLASS (ROUGHLY DEFINED AS PEOPLE WITHOUT COLLEGE EDUCATIONS)

The previous section underlines the importance of looking separately at young people by social class, for which educational attainment is a rough proxy. In general, CIRCLE finds that educational attainment is a more powerful correlate of civic engagement than is race or gender. (Young African-Americans are more engaged in most respects than whites; thus race is an important correlate, but it doesn’t work in the stereotypical direction.) These are some additional reasons to focus on class:

(1) The literature on civic education is dominated by studies of college students, even though they have much higher average levels of civic engagement than their peers who don’t attend college.

(2) Working-class adults are the ones who have really dropped out of civil society since 1970s, as documented in Broken Engagement, a report that CIRCLE and Harvard’s Saguaro Seminar prepared last year for the National Conference on Citizenship.

(3) Paying attention to class invites us to consider policy options that we will overlook if we concentrate on college students or if we examine aggregated statistics for the whole population.
4. STUDYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SERVICE AND POLITICS FOR YOUNG AMERICANS

According to Tocqueville in the 1830s; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in 1995; and many other authors, participation in voluntary, face-to-face activities leads to voting, political organizing, and activism. Civil society is a stimulus to politics in America.

However, the transition from voluntary service to politics is not automatic, especially not for young Americans today. The youth voter turnout rate fell by about one third between 1972 and 2000. Meanwhile, volunteering increased substantially, until almost four out of five American high school seniors reported volunteering—a rate substantially higher than in previous decades. To be sure, “civil society” is not synonymous with “volunteering.” However, in the public discourse and in policies (such as the federal national service programs), volunteering did come to stand for civic membership and participation, yet it did not generate robust political engagement. As Nicholas Longo and Ross Meyer (2006) wrote, the trends in voting and volunteering split apart during the 1990s like the blades of a pair of open scissors.

During this period, there were explicit conversations about the gap between volunteering and politics. A group of student leaders recruited by Campus Compact issued a statement on The New Student Politics (2002) in which they said, “what many perceive as disengagement may actually be a conscious choice; for example, a few of us … actively avoided voting, not wanting to participate in what some of us view as a deeply flawed electoral process. … While we still hope to be able to participate in our political system effectively through traditional means, service is a viable and preferable (if not superior) alternative at this time.”

The trend lines for voting and volunteering have converged since 2000, as youth voting has increased and volunteering has fallen from its high point. Nevertheless, the issue demands continued research. In what forms of political participation are young people engaging? (And how do they—and we—define "political"?) Why are political issues often avoided within associations and volunteering programs? What are young people themselves saying about the various civic and political roles that they may occupy?

5. STUDYING SERIOUS FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP THAT ARE INEVITABLY FAIRLY RARE

Some forms of civic engagement should be universal, or as close to universal as possible. For example, virtually everyone in a democracy should vote, follow the news, and volunteer at least occasionally. When we observe that more than half of eligible adults did not vote in the 2006 election, that tells us that something is wrong with our political system or our civil society.

A recent report by CIRCLE for the National Conference on Citizenship finds that about 35 million Americans discuss issues with other citizens and work directly on issues—a combination of talk and action that has been seen as the genius of American democracy since Alexis de Tocqueville.

However, there is another way to think about civic health and civic renewal. We need some citizens to do particularly demanding civic work in their communities: for instance, to discuss public issues and to work together creatively to address them. If we define such work in stringent ways, we will not expect to find most people so engaged. Yet it matters who takes on this serious work. Are they numerous enough to sustain our communities and public institutions? Are they diverse enough to reflect our many perspectives, cultures, and backgrounds? Are they well informed and aware of other points of view? And do they feel they have enough opportunities and support to do their civic work effectively?

A recent report by CIRCLE for the National Conference on Citizenship finds that about 35 million Americans discuss issues with other citizens and work directly on issues—a combination of talk and action that has been seen as the genius of American democracy since Alexis de Tocqueville. We also show that about 40 million Americans use the Internet for three or more civic purposes. An overlapping but distinct 40 million say that they discuss issues with people who have views different from their own (our definition of "deliberation").

Research should focus on these more demanding forms of engagement so that we can learn which forms of education, organizing, and policy encourage young people to participate
in these ways. Such research will have to be qualitative as well as quantitative, because a concept like “deliberation” cannot be adequately measured with survey questions alone (although surveys are useful).

6. COMBINING PHILOSOPHY WITH EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Educating young people for citizenship is an intrinsically “normative” task. In other words, it is a matter of choosing and transmitting values to citizens so that they will build and sustain societies that embody particular forms of justice and virtue. Yet there is relatively little discussion of the precise normative reasons for particular forms of civic education in schools and other institutions.

This lack of explicit attention to normative reasons is unfortunate. Reasonable people have defined “good citizens” in various ways: for example, as dutiful members of communities, as independent critics of public institutions, as bearers of rights, and as proponents of social justice. Deciding which of these values to transmit is a public task in which everyone has a stake.

Second, explicit discussion of values can reveal the tradeoffs that often arise in civic education. One category of tradeoff (as an example) involves quantity versus equality. Many voluntary programs attract adolescents who already have relatively strong commitments to civic engagement and relatively strong skills for civic and political participation. Student governments, for instance, usually draw students who are already on a leadership track. Those students tend to be successful in school and thus likely to hold privileged social positions as adults. Offering them civic opportunities may enhance their capacity to participate in politics and community affairs. That is a good result if we want to increase the total amount of civic engagement in the next generation. But it is a bad outcome if we are mainly concerned about equality of civic participation by social class.

Third, we need normative reasons to address a vexing problem. When young people do not engage with a public institution (for example, when they do not vote), that could be because they lack some mental state that we wish they possessed, such as interest, knowledge, concern, confidence, or commitment. Or it could be because the institution is flawed and discourages participation. (For instance, electoral districts in the United States have been drawn to discourage competition, thereby making most campaigns meaningless.) Whether to change young people’s minds or reform institutions—or both—is a crucial issue that cannot be addressed without deciding what constitutes a just society.

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Finally, explicit normative argumentation can provide persuasive reasons to invest in civic development—reasons that would otherwise be overlooked at a time when then default justification of any educational investment is to increase graduates’ value in the labor market. By elucidating reasons for civic development, we may be able to increase public support. We may also reduce our dependence on fragile empirical rationales. For instance, even if service-learning enhances students’ grades, it may turn out that other interventions do so more efficiently. Should we therefore give up on service-learning? That would be an appropriate conclusion if the only purpose of service-learning were to increase human capital. But there are other plausible reasons for it.

7. CONSIDERING “CIVIC ENGAGEMENT” AS A NEW ACADEMIC FIELD

Although there is a growing body of research on civic engagement, it is scattered across the academy, and there is no field (let alone a discipline) devoted to the topic. Launching new fields is always difficult, and it might be wiser to distribute the study of citizenship across the various disciplines. Nevertheless, we think it is worth considering a new field, for the following reasons:

(1) Absent a discipline of civic engagement, there is not enough research that looks at social and political institutions and issues from the point of view of the citizen. A citizen needs to know: How should I act? That requires moral and ethical analysis, empirical evidence about how the world responds to various kinds of action by individuals and small groups, and strategic thinking that is helpful to people who do not happen to control major institutions. Academic research offers much relevant material, but it is scattered. For example, there have been few attempts to combine the empirical study of politics with normative questions relevant to a citizen who is...
(2) The lack of a discipline of civic engagement has consequences for K-12 education. Our schools face relentless pressure to prepare students for college; they therefore adjust their curricula to copy colleges and universities. “Civics” is a traditional subject in K-12 schools, but there is no analogous discipline in higher education. As a result, the high school social studies curriculum is increasingly dominated by introductory versions of college-level social sciences. “Civics” or “American Government” courses now closely imitate Political Science 101. This is a loss if we think that schools should be places to discuss and study citizenship.

Thus it will be fruitful to think in detail about a field of civic engagement. What would be central and what would be peripheral? What new directions would be most pressing? How should the field relate to other disciplines? We look forward to pursuing these and other questions at Tufts.

Several disciplines have deep historical commitments to civic engagement as a field of study. Some of the founding works of philosophy, e.g., Plato’s *Crito*, were essentially about how one should act as a citizen in relation to the *polis*. The Sophists of the ancient Greek city states and the humanists of the Italian Renaissance both promoted the study of historical and fictional narratives specifically in order to develop civic skills and commitments. The American Political Science Association, founded in 1903, created four successive high-profile committees on civic education before World War II. John William Burgess, a major political scientist who died in 1931, saw his discipline as a way to “prepare young men for the duties of public life.” And C. Wright Mills defended the “sociological imagination”—the ability to understand how individual actions fit into broader social contexts—as an essential civic skill.

Today, none of these disciplines is centrally concerned with how citizens ought to act, which is both a practical and a moral question. Normative questions are assigned to philosophers and political theorists, who are not primarily interested in the choices that face individuals *qua* citizens. (Most philosophical analysis concerns private choices, such as abortion; professional ethics; or the “basic structure” of a just society. But there is a large gap between imagining a just society and deciding to act.) In the social sciences, the main empirical questions concern institutions and social trends, not individual agency. Historians and literary critics rarely advance explicit arguments about how citizens should act.

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